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When monitoring a reactor site for nuclear nonproliferation purposes, the presence of an unknown or hid-
den nuclear reactor could be obscured by the activities of a known reactor of much greater power nearby.
us when monitoring reactor activities by the observation of antineutrino emissions, one must discriminate
known background reactor uxes from possible unknown reactor signals under investigation. To quantify this
discrimination, we nd the condence to reject the (null) hypothesis of a single proximal reactor, by exploiting
directional antineutrino signals in the presence of a second, unknown reactor. In particular, we simulate the
inverse beta decay (IBD) response of a detector lled with a 1 kT ducial mass of Gadolinium-doped liquid
scintillator in mineral oil. We base the detector geometry on that of WATCHMAN, an upcoming antineutrino
monitoring experiment soon to be deployed at the Boulby mine in the United Kingdom whose design and
deployment will be detailed in a forthcoming white paper. From this simulation, we construct an analytical
model of the IBD event distribution for the case of one 4 GWt±2% reactor 25 km away from the detector site,
and for an additional, unknown, 35 MWt reactor 3 to 5 km away. e eects of natural-background rejection
cuts are approximated. Applying the model, we predict 3σ condence to detect the presence of an unknown
reactor within ve weeks, at standos of 3 km or nearer. For more distant unknown reactors, the 3σ detection
time increases signicantly. However, the relative signicance of directional sensitivity also increases, provid-
ing up to an eight week speedup to detect an unknown reactor at 5 km away. erefore, directionally sensitive
antineutrino monitoring can accelerate the mid-eld detection of unknown reactors whose operation might
otherwise be masked by more powerful reactors in the vicinity.
∗ To whom correspondence should be addressed.
E-mail: daine@uchicago.edu
I. INTRODUCTION
In any antineutrino reactor-monitoring scenario, ob-
servers contend with low event rates, time constraints on
observation, and backgrounds both articial and natural. In
particular, known energy-producing reactors can overwhelm
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2FIG. 1: e mid-eld reactor conguration under study,
relative to an antineutrino detector at the origin. A known
4 GWt reactor sits 25 km in the x-direction, with a second,
unknown 35 MWt reactor at a stando d, with an azimuthal
separation φ. We investigate the sensitivity of the detector
to signify the presence of this second, unknown reactor.
signals of interest that might otherwise be observable to an
antineutrino monitor. us, a nonproliferation monitoring
program must characterize the requirements to detect the
presence of a signicant unknown reactor even in the vicin-
ity of a known reactor (Figure 1).
e WATCHMAN (Water Cherenkov Monitor for Anti-
Neutrinos) collaboration exists to demonstrate the utility of
water Cherenkov antineutrino monitoring for nuclear non-
proliferation reactor monitoring [1, 2]. As part of this collab-
oration’s broader interest in demonstrating the utility of an-
tineutrinomonitoring for nuclear nonproliferation, we inves-
tigate a detector with equivalent geometry to the WATCH-
MAN detector, but with an alternate ducial composition.
To incorporate both event-rate and directional sensitivity,
we consider a 1 kT-ducial detector lled with Gadolinium-
doped liquid scintillator dissolved inmineral oil. For antineu-
trinos of energy less than 15MeV, we exploit the knownweak
preference for backwards positron emission [3], combined
with the neutron’s forward kinematics, to reconstruct a vec-
tor from the reconstructed neutron capture vertex to the cen-
troid of positron scintillation. In the case of a single antineu-
trino source, the expectation direction of this vector points
back towards the source reactor.
e purpose of this work is to characterize the sensitivity
of such a detector to resolve the presented monitoring sce-
nario using the direction-sensitive hypothesis testing tech-
niques presented below, and to develop a simple analytical
method for modeling IBD event spatial distributions in the
development of future detectors and applications.
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FIG. 2: Relative positron-centroid xy-positions for 20,000
simulated inverse beta decays from reactor-spectrum [4]
antineutrinos. Events take place in a 16 m× 16 m cylindrical
volume of mineral oil, doped with 0.100% Gadolinium and
0.177% PPO scintillator dissolved in 19.8% pseudocumene.
We plot the centroid of scintillation for each positron,
relative to its coincident neutron capture–dening the
origin. Red error bars indicate the population standard
deviation, centered on the population mean.
II. METHODS
A. Simulation and Modeling
We consider an antineutrino detector sensitive to the
positron & neutron-capture double coincidence characteris-
tic of inverse beta decay (IBD). In particular, we model the
response of such a detector to multiple ssion reactors, at ar-
bitrary positions. Applying this model, we will analyze the
expected response of our detector in the presence of two re-
actors given azimuthal separation φ, and each ith reactor’s
detected integrated ux Ni.
First we consider the single-reactor case, from which to
construct the n-reactor case by linear superposition. Us-
ing Geant4 [5] via rat-pac [6], we simulate the positron
tracks and positron centroid vertices resulting from reactor-
spectrum [4] antineutrinos interacting in a 16 m × 16 m
cylindrical volume ofmineral oil, dopedwith 0.100%Gadolin-
ium by mass and 0.177% PPO scintillator dissolved in
19.8% pseudocumene. Figure 2 shows the resulting xy-
projected positron track midpoints, ploed relative to the
respective neutron capture vertices–dening the origin. We
model the distribution of these vertices by ing an uncorre-
lated tri-gaussian to them, thus obtaining the distribution pa-
rameters given in Table I. Hereaer, we call this the “positron
centroid distribution.”
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FIG. 3: Cosine density histograms for rat-pac/Geant4 Monte
Carlo (blue) and samples drawn from the cosine marginal
distribution of our model (orange). e good agreement
(χ2/dof=1) validates our analytical model (1) against Monte
Carlo truth prior to vertex reconstruction uncertainty (3).
TABLE I: Uncorrelated tri-gaussian parameters describing
positron midpoint positions relative to neutron captures.
q µq (mm) σq (mm)
x 14.4± 0.2 33.1± 0.2
y 0.1± 0.2 33.5± 0.2
z −0.3± 0.2 33.1± 0.2
By modeling the positron centroid distribution as a sin-
gle tri-gaussian, we implicitly ‘average’ over some higher-
order corrections due to the energy dependance of the neu-
tron thermalization length [3]. Similarly, by drawing neutron
energies from a reactor IBD spectrum before neutrino oscilla-
tions, we neglect thermalization length modulations arising
from those oscillations, these being higher-order corrections
at the baselines under consideration (<∼ 0.1% eect on time
to 3σ detection). Importantly, however, we retain the pri-
mary eect of oscillations to modulate the IBD event rate.
Given the parameters in Table I, and noting σx ∼= σy ∼=
σz ≡ σ, we therefore model the single-reactor (n=1) positron
centroid distribution by,
dN
d3r
(~r|n=1) = N√
2πσ2
3 e
−(~r−~µ)2
2σ2 , (1)
whereN is the detected integrated ux and d3r = dxdydz =
r2 sin θdθdφdr. By extension, the n-reactor case samples a
linear combination of distributions of the same form, given
by,
dN
d3r
(~r|n) =
n∑
i=1
Ni√
2πσ2i
3 e
−(~r−~µi)
2
2σ2
i , (2)
where ~µi and σi now denote the mean and standard devia-
tion, respectively, of the ith reactor’s positron centroid dis-
tribution, along any direction. e isotropic variance of the
positron centroid distribution described in Table I suggests
the approximately reactor-independent magnitudes σi ≈
σj ≡ σ and µi ≈ µj ≡ µ, where i and j indicate dierent
reactors.
To model the eect of vertex position reconstruction error,
we marginalize dN/d3r over an uncorrelated tri-gaussian
with
√∑
i δqi
2 = δr
√
2 and δqi ≈ δqj = δr
√
2/3 where
δr denotes the vertex reconstruction resolution, and the fac-
tor of
√
2 arises from the geometric sum of uncorrelated
errors on the two reconstructed vertices in an IBD double-
coincidence. We neglect the anisotropy of the positron mid-
point reconstruction error along its scintillation track, on the
grounds that, for the antineutrino energies under considera-
tion, the positron track length is negligibly small relative to
the vertex resolution itself [7]. For a reconstructed vertex r˜,
dN
d3r˜
(r˜|n) = 1√
2π
(
δr
√
2/3
)23
∫
∀~r
e
−(r˜−~r)2
2(δr
√
2/3)2
dN
d3r
(~r|n)d3r
=
n∑
i=1
Nie
−(r˜−~µi)
2
2
[
σ2+(δr
√
2/3)
2
]
√
2π
[
σ2 +
(
δr
√
2/3
)2]3 (3)
Finally, since we have already shown the positron centroid
displacement magnitudes µi ≈ µj ≡ µ contain negligible
reactor discriminating power, we marginalize over the radius
|r˜| and the symmetry angleϕ′ to concern ourselves only with
the reconstructed polar cosine distribution,
dN
d cos θ˜
(
cos θ˜|n
)
=
∞∫
0
2π∫
0
dN
d3r˜
(r˜|n)|r˜|2dϕ′d|r˜|, (4)
Figure 3 justies our analytical model by showing good
agreementwithMonte Carlo truth prior to vertex reconstruc-
tion uncertainty.
To scale each reactor’s contribution to N , neglecting core
evolution, we approximate each ith reactor’s mean detected
IBD count 〈Ni〉 aer a duration t as,
〈Ni〉 (t) ≈ εnp t
4πL2i
pi
ǫ
∫ ∞
0
σ(E)Pee(Li/E)ϕ(E)dE, (5)
where ε is the total IBD detection eciency, np is the num-
ber of free ducial protons, Li is the propagation baseline,
pi is the reactor’s thermal power, ǫ = 200 MeV approxi-
mates the average ssion energy, E is antineutrino energy,
σ models the IBD cross section, Pee is the electron antineu-
trino survival probability, andϕmodels the fractional reactor
ux density [4].
4We model the IBD cross section as given in reference [8],
k1 = 0.07056
k2 = 0.02018
k3 = 0.001953
Ee = Eν − (mn −mp)
σ(ν¯ep) ≈ 10−43cm2peEeE−k1+k2 lnEν−k3 ln
3 Eν
ν
, (6)
where all energies and masses are expressed in MeV. is
model is accurate to within 0.5% for reactor antineutrino en-
ergies [8], and we include this systematic uncertainty in our
analysis and in Table II.
Without loss of generality, we restrict ourselves to the in-
verted mass hierarchy case. We nd a negligible event rate
discrepancy of less than 0.4% between the hierarchies. How-
ever, for the baselines under consideration, the inverted hier-
archy yields up to 5% larger systematic uncertainties, so we
choose it as the conservative case.
For given detected integrated uxes Ni, we calculate the
expected histogram by integrating (4) into bins of width
∆cos θ˜ as justied by Freedman and Diaconis [9],
∆cos θ˜ = 2
IQR
3
√∑
iNi
, (7)
where IQR is the interquartile range of the reconstructed po-
lar cosine distribution. We give this histogram both total ux
(correlated) and Poisson (uncorrelated) bin uncertainties.
E. Caden’s work on behalf of the Double Chooz collabo-
ration demonstrates that judicious cuts can reduce natural
background-induced eects to negligible levels in direction-
ality studies [10]. Hence the eect of natural backgrounds is
approximated through their impact on the overall detection
eciency ε.
B. Hypothesis Testing
To characterize the sensitivity of our detector to distin-
guishing a two-reactor scenario from the one-reactor (null)
hypothesis, we consider the one-sided 95% condence inter-
val (CI) limit on signicance to reject the null hypothesis,
quantifying signicance as the Z-score of the reduced chi-
square test statistic [11],
Z = Φ−1

1−
∞∫
χ2
f(z; dof)dz

 , (8)
where Φ−1 is the quantile of the standard Gaussian, and f is
the χ2 probability density function. To predict the one-sided
condence interval limit on Z with a condence level CL,
we use a conservative approximation following [12]. For an
upper limit,
ZCL <∼ Z|Ni=〈Ni〉+δNiΦ−1(1−CL), (9)
0.004
0.006
0.008
-30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
x(mm)
y
(m
m
)
isolated known reactor
(a) e null hypothesis: a single reactor signal
in the positive x-direction.
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(b) e unknown reactor signal, in isolation,
shown for a reactor in the negative
x-direction (φ = pi).
FIG. 4: IBD positron centroid event count xy-distributions
for (a) the known 4 GWt± 2% reactor at a 25km stando,
and (b) the unknown 35 MWt reactor in isolation at a 5 km
stando, both aer one month of exposure. e origin
marks the neutron capture vertex, by denition. Error bars
show the standard deviation on the mean of each
distribution, centered on the mean. Contours values denote
the constant value of the distribution along them. e color
scale is reset between (a) and (b) to accommodate their
dierent total event counts, as evidenced by the contour
values.
where ZCL is the limit, and from the i
th reactor 〈Ni〉 counts
the expected IBD detections with a total uncertainty δNi. For
a lower limit, we reverse the inequality and subtract δNi in-
stead.
5TABLE II: Systematic Uncertainties in Expected IBD Event
Count
source systematic uncertainty (σs)i/ 〈N〉
thermal power 2%
IBD cross section 0.5% [8]
reactor neutrino anomaly 2%
oscillation parameters See reference [13]
1. Systematic Uncertainties
Systematic uncertainties accumulate from thermal power
IBD conversion, cross section uncertainties [8], avor oscil-
lation uncertainties, and any reactor-anomaly shi. Each of
these modulates the expectation number of total IBD events
in the single reactor (null) hypothesis (5). We apply the sys-
tematic uncertainties shown in Table II:
N(t|n=1) = 〈N1〉 (t) ±
√
〈N1〉 (t) ±
√∑
m
(σs)2m, (10)
where 〈N1〉 (t) counts the expected IBD detections due to
the known reactor, aer a period t. Since none of these sys-
tematics (σs)m exhibit angular dependence, they manifest as
bin-to-bin correlated uncertainties when histogramming the
null hypothesis. To accommodate bin-to-bin correlated un-
certainties, we apply the generalized form of χ2 when testing
the null hypothesis,
χ2 ≡ (Oj − Ej)[σ2kj ]−1(Ok − Ek), (11)
whereOj is the observed histogram,Ej is the null hypothesis
expectation, σ2kj is the covariancematrix [14], and j, k are bin
indices under Einstein summation.
Figure 5 presents two-reactor scenarios, showing the su-
perposition of these distributions for a selection of azimuthal
separations φ and a xed unknown reactor stando d =
5 km.
III. RESULTS
For this scenariowe assume a total IBD detection eciency
of ε = 80% aer detector losses and background rejection
cuts, and a Daya Bay [15] or Double Chooz [16]-like spa-
tial resolution of δr = 15 cm. is justies our previous
assertion that the positron reconstruction error is only neg-
ligibly anisotropic: the entire positron scintillation track is
∼ 0.5 mm for reactor antineutrino energies [7], which is
negligible relative to this 15 cm vertex resolution. When cal-
culating the propagation baseline for each stando, we as-
sume a 500 m detector overburden.
Figure 4 (a) shows the single-reactor positron centroid xy-
distribution aer one month of exposure to a 4 GWt ssion
reactor located 25 km in the positive x-direction, and (b)
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FIG. 5: IBD positron centroid event count xy-distributions
for two-reactor scenarios, varying the azimuthal separation
φ ∈ {0, π/2, π} between the known and unknown reactors.
e known, 4 GWt reactor sits at a 25 km stando, while
the unknown 35 MWt reactor sits at a d = 5 km stando, all
aer one month of exposure. We dene the origin and error
bars as in Figure 4.
6FIG. 6: Predicted reconstructed cosine histograms aer one
year monitoring two reactors with an azimuthal separation
φ = π, for unknown-reactor standos d = 3 km (top) and
d = 5 km (boom). Larger σ values indicate a stronger
signicance to detect the unknown reactor (reject the null
hypothesis).
We test the two-reactor total signal (blue, le insets for
detail) against the single reactor (null) hypothesis (green,
center insets for detail). For completeness, we also plot the
unknown-reactor signal component (red, right insets for
detail). We plot only statistical uncertainties, whereas σ
accounts for both systematic and statistical uncertainties.
See Appendix A for a range of azimuthal separations
φ ∈ {0, π/4, π/2, 3π/4}.
shows the same for exposure to a 35 MWt ssion reactor lo-
cated 5 km in the negative x-direction. Given the high-power
reactor’s presence is known, Figure 4 (a) depicts the null hy-
pothesis for detection of the additional low-power reactor’s
presence.
Figure 6 presents expected two-reactor and one-reactor re-
constructed cosine histograms aer one year of monitoring,
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FIG. 7: Rejection of the single-reactor (null) hypothesis over
time in the presence of an unknown 35 MWt reactor at
d ∈ {3, 4, 5} km for φ ∈ {0, π}, given a known 4 GWt
reactor at 25 km. We plot the lower limit of the 95%
condence interval, as integrated downward from σ = +∞,
thus giving a worst-case statistical bound.
for the maximum azimuthal separation (φ = π), at unknown
reactor standos of d = 3 km and d = 5 km.
IV. DISCUSSION
For the detector under consideration, the time to achieve
3σ detection of the unknown reactor depends more strongly
on the detector-reactor stando than it does on directional
discrimination. Figure 7 shows that for a reactor-detector
stando of 3 km, 3σ detection is likely (95% CL) within 5
weeks. However, the time required extends through 15weeks
(φ = π) to 16 weeks (φ = 0) for 4 km, and 52 weeks (φ = π)
to 60 weeks (φ = 0) for 5 km. When compared to this strong
stando dependence, directional discrimination plays a neg-
ligible role at 3 km, increasing towards an 8 week speedup at
5 km. Wemust note, however, that a detector designmore op-
timized for direction reconstruction could provide a greater
improvement in signicance for φ > 0.
Finally, Figure 8 shows the failure to reject the null hy-
pothesis in the absence of a second reactor. In this case, in
which the null hypothesis is in fact true, the condence in-
terval limit begins at∼ 1σ and decreases monotonically. is
demonstrates that our method carries no bias towards false-
positive detection.
V. OUTLOOK
A. Techniques
We have simulated a WATCHMAN-based detector geom-
etry containing Gadolinium-doped liquid scintillator, and
characterized its spatial IBD response to an isotropic antineu-
trino source. From this we have derived a statistical model
describing the true detector event positions, their recon-
structed vertices, and the reconstructed directionality. is
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FIG. 8: Demonstration that our method carries no bias
towards detection, by its failure to reject the null hypothesis
over time in the absence of a second reactor, for a single
known 4 GWt reactor at 25 km. We plot the upper limit of
the 95% condence interval from −∞.
statistical analysis accepts, as input parameters: the number
and positions of source reactors, the true-position distribu-
tions, the achievable vertex resolution, the overall detector
eciency, and arbitrary additional correlated and uncorre-
lated uncertainties. We have developed a parallel-computing
Mathematica [17] code to ease the ecient production of fur-
ther analyses based on this statistical model.
In future, we see natural applications for this model in run-
ning similar analyses on various reactor-detector congura-
tions.
B. Nonproliferation
We have characterized the sensitivity of a 1 kT ducial
volume of GdLS mineral oil to detect the presence of a sec-
ond, unknown reactor, for a range of congurations on the
ground. We have shown evidence for feasible month-scale
rapid detection of an unknown, second reactor in the pres-
ence of a more powerful, known reactor, provided sucient
proximity (d ≤ 3 km) to the unknown source. For more
distant standos, the time to detect increases signicantly.
We have also shown that, for our detector design, the di-
rectional sensitivity inherent to our chosen ducial material
contributes only marginally in discovering an unknown re-
actor azimuthally separated from a known one at 3 km, but
that increasing the unknown stando through 5 km increases
the relative contribution of directional sensitivity, providing
up to a 24% speedup for φ = π relative to φ = 0 (Figure 7).
Looking beyond this work, it is reasonable to expect that
more directionally-optimized detector congurations may
achieve the order-of-magnitude reduction in detection time
required to enable month-scale monitoring for the presence
of unknown reactors at farther mid-eld standos. Future
studies by theWATCHMAN collaboration will explore multi-
detector and segmented-detector deployments to character-
ize their eectiveness at this task.
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8Appendix A:
FIG. 9: Predicted reconstructed cosine histograms aer one
year monitoring two reactors for a range of azimuthal
separations φ ∈ {0, π/4, π/2, 3π/4}, for an
unknown-reactor stando of d = 3 km. Larger σ values
indicate a stronger signicance to detect the unknown
reactor (reject the null hypothesis). We plot by to the same
method as described in Figure 6, which shows the
comparable result for φ = π.
FIG. 10: Predicted reconstructed cosine histograms aer one
year monitoring two reactors for a range of azimuthal
separations φ ∈ {0, π/4, π/2, 3π/4}, for an
unknown-reactor stando of d = 5 km. Larger σ values
indicate a stronger signicance to detect the unknown
reactor (reject the null hypothesis). We plot by to the same
method as described in Figure 6, which shows the
comparable result for φ = π.
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